15.11.2009
counterintelligence, Economic espionage, security, security threats, Technology, Uncategorized
It seems the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) is in the news again. Just when you’d think they addressed the vulnerabilities that Wen Ho Lee exploited back in 1999 (Lee has his own Wikipedia page now), they got slammed again in 2006 when local police found a thumb-drive with classified information on it at local residence involved in a local narcotics investigation. Well now the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) just release an audit report of LANL that reported:
LANL has implemented measures to enhance its information security controls, but significant weaknesses remain in protecting the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of information stored on and transmitted over its classified computer network. The laboratory’s classified computer network had vulnerabilities in several critical areas, including (1) uniquely identifying and authenticating the identity of users, (2) authorizing user access, (3) encrypting classified information, (4) monitoring and auditing compliance with security policies, and (5) maintaining software configuration assurance.
While LANL got slammed for losing information on its ”classified” network…what about all of the unclassified information that’s floating around out there? I feel it is just as important to make sure all of the sensitive but unclassified case information, organization proprietary information, or intelligence data that contains Personally Identifiable Information (PII) is protected as well–would you want to be the person explaining to their boss what data was just lost on that USB drive you left at the airport restaurant?
While I was at the International Association of Chiefs of Police Conference in Denver last month, I ran across a security item that really caught my eye–it was a standard, run of the mill 4GB USB thumb drive, but this one was unique–it had a built in PIN keypad, encrypted all data with AES encryption, and you didn’t have to plug it in to the computer first before unlocking it. I got to thinking…if every law enforcement officer and intelligence analyst who had a legal, bonafied reason for copying sensitive data onto portable media like CD-ROMs, SD cards, or unsecured thumb drives had one of these, they could sleep better at night knowing that the information on the thumb drive wouldn’t be compromised if it were lost or stolen, or than an unauthorized person who happend to get access to the drive couldn’t stick it in their computer and access the information it holds.
The item is called the Classified Secure Flash Drive. It’s a 4GB thumb drive with a built in 5-key keypad for entering a 1-10 digit PIN. There is NO software required on the desktop/laptop to create or enter the PIN and all data on it is secured with 256 bit AES encryption. Those of you who know me know that I do not want to become another big IT vendor; however, I have decided to make these (and other innovative, niche technologies) available to agencies through NOWHERETOHIDE.ORG. For Federal agencies; the manufacturer has developed a FIPS 140-2 compliant version with a built in 10-key keypad; they are in the midst of the validation process now.
10.11.2009
counterintelligence, Economic espionage, espionage, law enforcement, security, security threats
When most people think of spies, they think of the Rosenbergs who gave up atomic research in 1942, John Walker who gave up Naval radio communications in the 1980s, or the likes of Aldrich Ames and Bob Hanssen who compromised CIA and FBI programs (respectively). But, have you ever heard of Ho, Yang or Min?
- Chester Ho, a naturalized U.S. citizens, was arrested after stealing the plant cell culture technology from Bristol-Myers Squibb–nearly $15 million loss
- Hwei-Chen Yang was arrested after stealing adhesive trade secrets from Avery Denison–nearly $60 million loss
- Yonggang Min walked out the door of Dupont with more than 16,000 documents from DuPont’s electronic library–nearly $600 million loss
While the Rosenbergs, Ames and Hanssen were guilty of National Security Espionage, Ho, Yang and Min were clearly engaged in Economic Espionage, or “the act of theft or misappropriation of (commercial) trade secrets.” What makes this particularly significant is the fact that the potential for economic espionage exists in virtually every corner of our way of life–government agencies, small companies, large corporations, colleges, universities, overseas research and development laboratories, and economic espionage is largely driven by one of three motives:
- Profit;
- Patriotism to home country; or
- Desire to achieve academic/scientific notoriety.
While the majority of the threat can come from any of the 108 countries actively seeking to collect information about American innovations, and (a sub-set) of the 30,000,000 non-immigrant visitors to our nation every year, the threat can also come from within; companies in like sectors would love to know what the others in that sector are working on–new prescription drug? Next Ipod? Alternative fuel technologies?
So, who can threaten your innovations and intellectual property?
- Insider threats–people working for you;
- People and companies that you partner with;
- Subcontractors providing services
- University students doing research for you;
- Visitors that have an interest in what you do; or
- Competitors who seek to do you harm.
Interesting side note: 75% of the 40 proprietary and confidential information thefts studied between 1996 and 2002 by Carnegie Mellon’s CERT program in a July 2006 study were committed by current employees. Of those current employees committing intellectual property thefts, 45% had already accepted a job offer with another company. “In between the time they have another offer and the time they leave is when they take the information”
At the end of the day, you (and your organization’s leaders) are responsible for the survival of your organization, and only you can really know “Who’s in Your House” and what they are doing. The other way to put it is that if something bad happens, only you will be standing there explaining to your board of directors and shareholders what happened.
So what can you do to protect yourself? I suggest five key strategies:
- Ask the right questions;
- Do the math;
- Trust, but verify;
- Use the velvet rope and black cloth; and
- Educate, communicate and reward.
1. Ask the Right Questions
Corporate presidents and CEOs should regularly ask their security officers the following five questions:
- What technologies/projects are most at risk?
- Why are others interested in it?
- Who are the specific threats?
- Where are the vulnerabilities?
- How are we stopping them from getting it?
Establish a good idea of what an adversary might be after, why they’re after it, and what your organization is doing to protect it from compromise. For larger organizations, with many projects, you should go through this exercise with each program/product.
2. Do the Math
You cannot protect everything, so develop a strategy to identify and protect those projects and technologies that can cause the most dire consequences to your bottom line. I suggest dividing up your organization’s projects/products into three piles.
- Pile One = those projects that the future of your company rests on or those that you risk jail time for compromise;
- Pile Two = Those projects that are important, but expendable; and
- Pile Three = Those projects that are commodities or already in the open source.
Here is some sample criteria to help you decide which pile a project may belong in:
Sample Criteria for Pile One
- Classified or sensitive national security project
- New research and development effort
- Loss would mean significant loss of revenue and new CEO
Sample Criteria for Pile Two
- Company future doesn’t hinge on product survival
- No significant IP or trade secrets involved
- Product at the middle of “S” curve
Sample Criteria for Pile Three
- No IP or trade secrets involved
- Commodity type product or service; top of the “S” curve
- Already in the public domain
Remember: Focus on Pile One FIRST–do not be tempted to go after the low-hanging furit in piles two or three.
To be continued…In Part 2 of 2, I’ll finish with Key Strategies 3, 4 and 5.
As always, comments and houghts are welcome.
Chuck Georgo, chuck@nowheretohide.org
Chuck has served as a strategic planner, business analyst, and technologist for the National Security Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of Homeland Security, Naval Criminal Investigative Service, Naval Security Group, Illinois State Police, and many other public and private sector organizations. He helped these agencies to develop meaningful strategies, to implement innovative technologies, and to assess their success towards achievement of desired public safety and homeland security results. He currently serves as Executive Director for NOWHERETOHIDE.ORG, First Vice President of the InfraGard Maryland Members Alliance, and Chairman, IJIS Institute Security and Privacy Committee.